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    <title>ROBERT ELGIE&#13;&#13;&#13;NOW ON FACEBOOK&#13;&#13;</title>
    <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Blog.html</link>
    <description>** NAMED AS ONE OF THE 50 BEST BLOGS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDENTS **&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;What is semi-presidentialism?&lt;br/&gt;where a constitution includes a popularly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the legislature&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The assumption&lt;br/&gt;A very varied set of countries have semi-presidential constitutions. We should not use semi-presidentialism as an explanatory variable. We should distinguish between different types of semi-presidentialism and explore the effects of each&lt;br/&gt;NEW BOOK&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;DOWNLOAD PAPERS&lt;br/&gt;Elgie, R. (2005) ‘From Linz to Tsebelis: three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies?’, Democratization, 12 (1). pp. 106-122&lt;br/&gt;Elgie, R. (2004) ‘Semi-presidentialism: concepts, consequences and contesting explanations.’ Political Studies Review, 2 (3). pp. 314-330&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Interested in the 2012 French elections? Follow me on Twitter&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Talk on semi-presidentialism&lt;br/&gt;ECPR, 30 August 2010&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Semi-presidential podcast&lt;br/&gt;Available to download here&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;LINKS TO REGULAR ITEMS&lt;br/&gt;Definitions&lt;br/&gt;Up-to-date list of SP countries&lt;br/&gt;Up-to-date list of SP sub-types&lt;br/&gt;List of presidential, parliamentary and other countries&lt;br/&gt;SP in other areas and territories&lt;br/&gt;Historic cases of SP&lt;br/&gt;‘Difficult’ cases of SP&lt;br/&gt;List of cohabitations&lt;br/&gt;’Difficult’ cases of cohabitation&lt;br/&gt;List of divided executives&lt;br/&gt;Is this the first reference to SP?&lt;br/&gt;What was the first SP country?&lt;br/&gt;Countries that have debated introducing SP&lt;br/&gt;New SP publications&lt;br/&gt;SP resources&lt;br/&gt;Maurice Duverger&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;SP BOOKS&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;palgrave.com&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;amazon.co.uk&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;amazon.co.uk&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; Manchester University Press&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Friendly blogs&lt;br/&gt;Fruits And Votes&lt;br/&gt;La Constitution en Afrique&lt;br/&gt;The Monkey Cage&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;IRCHSS&lt;br/&gt;I would like to acknowledge the support of the IRCHSS for the award of a Senior Research Fellowship (2009-2010) that helped me to maintain this blog and to continue my research on semi-presidentialism&lt;br/&gt;OTHER ITEMS&lt;br/&gt;Full list of publications&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;ROBERT ELGIE&lt;br/&gt;Dublin City University&lt;br/&gt;robert.elgie@dcu.ie</description>
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      <title>Kyrgyzstan - Presidential veto</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/17_Kyrgyzstan_-_PM_elected_2.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 17 May 2012 08:30:28 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>The Kyrgyzstan News Agency is &lt;a href=&quot;http://eng.24.kg/politic/2012/05/11/24203.html&quot;&gt;reporting&lt;/a&gt; that President Almazbek Atambayev has vetoed a bill.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;There are very few details, but the bill seems to have created a 7 per cent threshold for party representation on local councils. The logic seems to be that at the local level parties are not well organised and that representation is usually local and/or personal. So, the bill would seem to be designed to help increase party institutionalisation, but it has now been vetoed.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The constitution states that a presidential veto can be overridden by a two-thirds majority in the legislature.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;President Atambayev is from the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK). The government is a four-party coalition comprising the SDPK, Respublika, Ar-Namys and Ata-Meken. The Ata-Zhurt party is the only opposition faction.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Previous Kyrgyzstan posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/12/20_Kyrgyzstan_-_PM_elected.html&quot;&gt;20 December 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/12/2_Kyrgyzstan_-_Presidential_inauguration,_negotiations_about_new_government.html&quot;&gt;2 December 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/11/2_Kyrgyzstan_-_Opposition_deputies_defect_2.html&quot;&gt;2 November 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/9/12_Kyrgyzstan_-_Opposition_deputies_defect_2.html&quot;&gt;12 September 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/4/21_Kyrgyzstan_-_Opposition_deputies_defect.html&quot;&gt;21 April 2011&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/12/16_Kyrgyzstan_-_Coalition_negotiations_2.html&quot;&gt;16 December 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/11/17_Kyrgyzstan_-_Coalition_negotiations.html&quot;&gt;17 November 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/10/14_Kyrgyzstan_-_Draft_constitution_approved_2.html&quot;&gt;14 October 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/6/28_Kyrgyzstan_-_Draft_constitution_approved.html&quot;&gt;28 June 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/6/21_Kyrgyzstan_-_Constitutional_situation_clarified_2.html&quot;&gt;21 June 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/4/29_Kyrgyzstan_-_Constitutional_situation_clarified.html&quot;&gt;29 April 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/4/14_Kyrgyzstan_-_Opposition_seizes_power_2.html&quot;&gt;14 April 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/4/9_Kyrgyzstan_-_Constitutional_amendments_2.html&quot;&gt;9 April 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/2/8_Kyrgyzstan_-_Constitutional_amendments.html&quot;&gt;8 February 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/10/22_Kyrgyzstan_-_Presidential_election_2.html&quot;&gt;22 October 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/7/27_Kyrgyzstan_-_Early_presidential_election_2.html&quot;&gt;27 July 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/2/23_Kyrgyzstan_-_ICG_Report_2.html&quot;&gt;23 February 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/11/27_Kyrgyzstan_-_Troubles.html&quot;&gt;27 November 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/8/21_Kyrgyzstan_-_ICG_Report.html&quot;&gt;21 August 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/3/7_Kyrgyzstan_-_New_constitution_%282007%29.html&quot;&gt;7 March 2008&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>France - Presidential inauguration, new PM</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/16_France_-_New_PM.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 17:26:49 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>François Hollande was inaugurated as President of France yesterday. Almost immediately afterwards he appointed the new PM, Jean-Marc Ayrault.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;PM Ayrault is mayor of Nantes and the former leader of the Socialist (PS) group in the National Assembly. In fact, he was leader of the PS group from 1997-2012.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Interestingly, neither President Hollande nor PM Ayrault has any ministerial experience. From 1997-2002, the last time the PS was in government, Hollande was leader of PS.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;There used to be a rule that the first PM under a new president was a political appointment, whereas the next PM was more technocratic. This rule held pretty well until 2007 when President Sarkozy appointed François Fillon but then kept the same PM for his full five-year term. Anyway, the appointment of PM Ayrault would certainly be classed as a political appointment rather than a technocratic one.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The set of ministers will be announced over the next few days. Given some people, such as Martine Aubry and Manuel Valls will be very disappointed not to be PM, they can expect senior ministerial positions.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Other France posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/5/16_France_-_New_PM.html&quot;&gt;9 May 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/4/23_France_-_Presidential_poll_2.html&quot;&gt;23 April 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/2/15_France_-_PS_primary_2nd_round_2.html&quot;&gt;15 February 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/10/17_France_-_PS_primary_2.html&quot;&gt;17 October 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/10/11_France_-_PS_primary.html&quot;&gt;11 October 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/9/27_France_-_Constitutional_law_passed_2.html&quot;&gt;27 September 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/7/14_France_-_Constitutional_law_passed.html&quot;&gt;14 July 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/6/30_France_-_Cabinet_reshuffle.html&quot;&gt;30 June 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/5/17_France_-_Cantonal_elections_2nd_round_2.html&quot;&gt;17 May 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/3/29_France_-_Cantonal_elections_2.html&quot;&gt;29 March 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/3/22_France_-_Government_reshuffle_2.html&quot;&gt;22 March 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/2/28_France_-_Government_reshuffle.html&quot;&gt;28 February 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/11/15_France_-_Sarkozy%E2%80%99s_problems_2.html&quot;&gt;15 November 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/7/14_France_-_Regional_elections_2nd_round_2.html&quot;&gt;14 July 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/3/26_France_-_Regional_elections_2nd_round.html&quot;&gt;26 March 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/3/16_France_-_Regional_elections.html&quot;&gt;16 March 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/2/4_France_-_Sarkozy_on_The_Simpsons_2.html&quot;&gt;4 February 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/10/8_France_-_Executive_popularity_2.html&quot;&gt;8 October 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/9/5_France_-_Executive_popularity.html&quot;&gt;5 September 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/6/8_France_-_EP_election.html&quot;&gt;8 June 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/3/10_Cohabitation_%284%29_-_France.html&quot;&gt;10 March 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/1/6_France_-_Pres_PM_relations.html&quot;&gt;6 January 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/9/23_France_-_Election_result_%28Senate%29.html&quot;&gt;23 September 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/24_France_-_Amendments_passed.html&quot;&gt;24 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/19_Haiti_PM_-_Update_2.html&quot;&gt;19 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>How many semi-presidential countries have a Vice President &amp; what do they do?</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/15_How_many_semi-presidential_countries_have_a_Vice_President_%26_what_do_they_do.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 20:15:59 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>Constitutionally, the answer to the ‘how many’ question is five: Bulgaria, Peru, Senegal, Taiwan and Tanzania. In practice, though, the answer is four. In 2009 Senegal passed a constitutional amendment creating the position of vice president. However, President Abdoulaye Wade, who was behind the reform, never appointed anyone. So, the answer to the how many question is fairly straightforward.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The answer to the ‘what do they do?’ question is more difficult. Peru and Tanzania have a prime minister and collective cabinet responsibility, but, in practice, they operate as presidential systems, even if Tanzania has a one-party dominant system as opposed to Peru’s typical Latin American fragmented party system. So, the role of the vice-president in these countries resembles those in equivalent presidential systems.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;In Taiwan, as far as I can tell, the role of the vice-president is merely to replace the president if the president dies, resigns, or is incapacitated. My understanding is that President Ma’s first vice-president, Vincent Siew, also met with representatives of mainland China at certain meetings, which was politically sensitive. However, the post seems to be mainly honorific. Any more information would be welcome.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;In Bulgaria, the vice-president assists the president (Art. 92 -2). In addition, Art. 104 states that the president “shall be free to devolve to the Vice President the prerogatives established by Art. 98 items 7, 9, 10 and 11.”. They are the power to “7. appoint and remove from office other state officials, established by law”, “9. grant, restore, relieve from and withdraw Bulgarian citizenship;”, “10. grant asylum;”, “11. exercise the right to pardon”. Does the vice president exercise any of these powers? The answer is yes.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;In Bulgaria, the vice-president’s use of the right to pardon has become politically controversial. For example, the Sofia News Agency, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=139119&quot;&gt;Novinite&lt;/a&gt;, reports that in the ten years from 2002-2012 Vice President Angel Marin signed 49 pardon decrees even when the Pardons Committee had recommended that the pardon should not be used. In total during this period the President and Vice-President together issued 529 pardons, including more than 200 people convicted for murder. Interestingly, since taking office in January 2012 the current Vice President, Margarita Popova, has issued only one pardon. When she did so, she identified very clear grounds for issuing the pardon, trying to differentiate her use of the pardon from her predecessor’s.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;So, Vice Presidents are very rare under semi-presidentialism. They are even rarer still in semi-presidential countries where the president is not a strong figure. Bulgaria is the only country where there is a weak president as well as a vice president. However, even in this latter case, the role of the Vice President can be controversial.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Other posts about general constitutional issues:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/11/11_SP_countries_where_the_president_is_head_of_government.html&quot;&gt;SP countries where the president is head of government&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/4/22_When_is_a_direct_election_not_a_direct_election.html&quot;&gt;When is a direct election not a direct election?&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/4/9_Interpellation_vs_motion_of_censure.html&quot;&gt;Interpellation vs motion of censure&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/2/4_When_should_we_start_to_consider_a_country_as_semi-presidential.html&quot;&gt;When should we start to consider a country as semi-presidential?&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>Armenia - Legislative election</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/11_Armenia_-_Legislative_election.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 11 May 2012 08:19:46 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>Parliamentary elections were held in Armenia on Sunday. The results confirm the dominance of the ruling parties, particularly the president’s party, the Republican Party (HHK). Here are the results from &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian_parliamentary_election,_2012&quot;&gt;Wikipedia&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;There are basically similar results &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.armenianow.com/vote_2012/37931/parliament_elections_facts_figures&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt; from Armenia Now.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The discussion now is whether the HHK needs to form a coalition. Prior to the election, it was in coalition with the Prosperous Armenia Party (BHK). However, the HHK now has an absolute majority.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The presidential election is scheduled for next year and, presumably, the HHK does not want to force the BHK into opposition and go alone into the election. Therefore, a coalition may still be possible.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The OSCE is &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.armenialiberty.org/archive/english/latest/1089/1089.html?id=24575678&quot;&gt;reported&lt;/a&gt; to have noted irregularities in a significant number of polling stations. The Electoral Commission has claimed that the election was held freely and fairly.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Previous Armenia posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/2/2_Armenia_-_Coalition_tensions.html&quot;&gt;2 February 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/11/21_Armenia_-_Ruling_party_loses_an_election.html&quot;&gt;21 November 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.armenialiberty.org/content/article/24390546.html&quot;&gt;29 June 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/4/20_Armenia_-_PM_and_ministers_join_ruling_party_2.html&quot;&gt;20 April 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/1/7_Armenia_-_PM_and_ministers_join_ruling_party.html&quot;&gt;7 January 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/11/30_Armenia_-_Report_on_1999_coup_2.html&quot;&gt;30 November 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/10/28_Armenia_-_New_article.html&quot;&gt;28 October 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/10/6_Armenia_-_Update.html&quot;&gt;6 October 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/2/22_Election_results_-_Armenia_%28presidential%29.html&quot;&gt;22 February 2008&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>Serbia - Presidential and legislative elections</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/10_Serbia_-_Presidential_and_legislative_elections.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 10 May 2012 18:06:03 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>In Serbia, concurrent presidential and legislative elections were held on Sunday.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Here are the results of the presidential election based on nearly all votes counted and as reported in B92:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Boris Tadić (Democratic Party, DS) - 25.33%&lt;br/&gt;Tomislav Nikolić (Serbian Progressive Party, SNS) - 24.99%&lt;br/&gt;Ivica Dačić (Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS) - 14.24%&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;I do not have the figures for the other candidates. However, the second round run-off will feature the incumbent president, Boris Tadić, and Tomislav Nikolić.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;As for the parliamentary elections, these are the figures from &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.cesid.org/lt/&quot;&gt;CeSID&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;SNS-led coalition - 73 seats &lt;br/&gt;The DS-led coalition - 68 seats&lt;br/&gt;SPS-led coalition - 45 seats&lt;br/&gt;Democratic Party of Serbia - 20 seats&lt;br/&gt;Liberal Democratic Party - 20 seats&lt;br/&gt;United Regions of Serbia - 16 seats&lt;br/&gt;Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians - 5 seats&lt;br/&gt;Others - 3 seats&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;So, the two questions are: who will win the presidential run-off and who will form the coalition in parliament?&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The two questions are clearly linked. The Socialist Party (SPS) is the kingmaker. The &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2012&amp;mm=05&amp;dd=09&amp;nav_id=80167&quot;&gt;suggestion&lt;/a&gt; is that Tadić will gain the support of the SPS and that the government will be a coalition between the DS, SPS, the United Regions of Serbia party, and the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians. While this would produce a parliamentary majority, whether it will be enough to secure the victory of Tadić in the presidential election is another matter.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The second round of the presidential election will take place on 20 May.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Other Serbia posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/4/6_Serbia_-_Cabinet_meetings_by_telephone_2.html&quot;&gt;6 April 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/2/9_Serbia_-_Government_reshuffle_2.html&quot;&gt;9 February 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/3/17_Serbia_-_Local_elections_2.html&quot;&gt;17 March 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/9/16_Cohabitation_%2819%29_-_Serbia.html&quot;&gt;16 September 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/6/15_Serbia_-_Local_election.html&quot;&gt;15 June 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/10_%28FYR%29Macedonia_and_Serbia_-_New_governments.html&quot;&gt;10 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/5/13_Election_results_-_Serbia_%28legislative%29.html&quot;&gt;13 May 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/3/13_Serbia_-_election_called.html&quot;&gt;13 March 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/2/13_Election_results_-_Serbia_%28presidential_2nd_round%29.html&quot;&gt;13 February 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/1/27_Election_results_-_Serbia.html&quot;&gt;27 January 2008&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>France - Presidential election, 2nd round</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/9_France_-_Presidential_election,_1st_round_2.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 9 May 2012 18:18:44 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>The second round of the French presidential election was held on Sunday. Here is the result:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;François Hollande (Socialist) - 51.68%&lt;br/&gt;Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP - right) - 48.32%&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;So, François Hollande becomes only the second socialist after François Mitterrand to be elected as president under the Fifth Republic (1958-). He is the first socialist president to be elected since 1988. Nicolas Sarkozy becomes the second incumbent president to fail to be re-elected. The first was Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1981.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The key test is now the legislative election. These will take place on 10 and 17 June. When legislative elections have closely followed presidential elections, they have usually generated a large presidential majority. This was the case in 1981, 2002 and 2007. However, in 1988 the Socialists enjoyed only a plurality, falling a handful of seats short of an absolute majority.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;This time, the Socialists can expect to win a majority in conjunction with the Greens, with whom they had already agreed a deal on seats at the legislative election prior to the presidential election. There is also the possibility that supporters of the Left Front candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, may be part of a coalition. However, no deal has been agreed with them and mutual désistement arrangements may be difficult to agree at this late stage.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Le Monde reports that at the second round of the presidential election Hollande was ahead of Sarkozy in 333 of the 577 legislative constituencies. While this is not a sure-fire indicator that the left will win such a majority in June, they are likely to do so. Indeed, maximising the likelihood that the president would be supported by a legislative majority was the main point of the 2000 constitutional amendment that reduced the length of the presidential term to five years and placed the presidential election before the legislative election.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The main talking point of the legislatives is how many seats the extreme-right National Front (FN) is likely to win. Up to now it has had difficulty winning any seats under the two-ballot plurality system. However, this time it might do so, especially in certain constituencies where there is a ‘triangular’ contest between the left and the UMP. However, I would not put money on them winning very many.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;As for the UMP, its very survival is at stake. Sarkozy is unlikely to play a role in the immediate future. Former PM and party grandee, Alain Juppé, has already announced that he will not be standing for election at the legislatives. There has been ongoing rivalry between the PM, François Fillon, and party leader, Jean-François Copé. The party may maintain some  semblance of unity prior to the legislatives, but it is unlikely to last. Some of the centrists are already semi-detached. The anti-European right of the party is well organised. In France, right-wing parties tend to be electoral vehicles for presidential candidates. It would not surprise me if the UMP ceased to exist in its current form over the course of the next few years.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Other France posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/4/23_France_-_Presidential_poll_2.html&quot;&gt;23 April 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/2/15_France_-_PS_primary_2nd_round_2.html&quot;&gt;15 February 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/10/17_France_-_PS_primary_2.html&quot;&gt;17 October 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/10/11_France_-_PS_primary.html&quot;&gt;11 October 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/9/27_France_-_Constitutional_law_passed_2.html&quot;&gt;27 September 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/7/14_France_-_Constitutional_law_passed.html&quot;&gt;14 July 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/6/30_France_-_Cabinet_reshuffle.html&quot;&gt;30 June 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/5/17_France_-_Cantonal_elections_2nd_round_2.html&quot;&gt;17 May 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/3/29_France_-_Cantonal_elections_2.html&quot;&gt;29 March 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/3/22_France_-_Government_reshuffle_2.html&quot;&gt;22 March 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/2/28_France_-_Government_reshuffle.html&quot;&gt;28 February 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/11/15_France_-_Sarkozy%E2%80%99s_problems_2.html&quot;&gt;15 November 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/7/14_France_-_Regional_elections_2nd_round_2.html&quot;&gt;14 July 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/3/26_France_-_Regional_elections_2nd_round.html&quot;&gt;26 March 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/3/16_France_-_Regional_elections.html&quot;&gt;16 March 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/2/4_France_-_Sarkozy_on_The_Simpsons_2.html&quot;&gt;4 February 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/10/8_France_-_Executive_popularity_2.html&quot;&gt;8 October 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/9/5_France_-_Executive_popularity.html&quot;&gt;5 September 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/6/8_France_-_EP_election.html&quot;&gt;8 June 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/3/10_Cohabitation_%284%29_-_France.html&quot;&gt;10 March 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/1/6_France_-_Pres_PM_relations.html&quot;&gt;6 January 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/9/23_France_-_Election_result_%28Senate%29.html&quot;&gt;23 September 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/24_France_-_Amendments_passed.html&quot;&gt;24 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/19_Haiti_PM_-_Update_2.html&quot;&gt;19 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>Cohabitation - Romania</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/8_Cohabitation_-_Romania.html</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">3031be2c-88a2-4be5-a76f-7d6bfec71d47</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 8 May 2012 18:44:51 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>This is a series of posts that records the cases of cohabitation in countries with semi-presidential constitutions. Cohabitation is defined as the situation where the president and prime minister are from different parties and where the president’s party is not represented in the cabinet. Presidents classed as non-party cannot generate any periods of cohabitation.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Here is my list of cohabitations in Romania:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Apr 2007- Dec 2008&lt;br/&gt;President - Traian Băsescu (PD/PD-L); PM - Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu (PNL); Coalition – PNL, UDMR&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;May 2012-&lt;br/&gt;President - Traian Băsescu (PD/PD-L); PM - Victor Ponta (PSD); Coalition – PSD, PNL&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The situation in Romania is unusual. The president’s party was in the governing coalition after the 2004 election. However, it left the government in April 2007 at the time when President Băsescu was  being impeached by parliament with support from members of the PNL. Thus, cohabitation began part way through a legislature and without an election occurring.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Exactly the same scenario occurred in May 2012. This time the ruling coalition, which included the president’s party, was defeated in a confidence motion. The opposition formed a government without the president’s party, thus beginning another period of cohabitation without an election having taken place.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Romania and São Tomé &amp;amp; Príncipe are the only cases where cohabitation has begun outside an election (presidential or legislative).&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Party abbreviations:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;PD-L (Democratic Liberal Party)&lt;br/&gt;PNL (National Liberal Party)&lt;br/&gt;PSD (Social Democratic Party)&lt;br/&gt;UDMR (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania)&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Previous posts in this series:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/2/11_Madagascar_-_Crisis_deepens_2.html&quot;&gt;Austria&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/2/17_Cohabitation_%282%29_-_Bulgaria.html&quot;&gt;Bulgaria&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/2/18_Cohabitation_%2820%29_-_Croatia.html&quot;&gt;Croatia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/9/18_Cohabitation_%2821%29_-_Cape_Verde.html&quot;&gt;Cape Verde&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/2/25_Cohabitation_%283%29_-_Finland.html&quot;&gt;Finland&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/3/10_Cohabitation_%284%29_-_France.html&quot;&gt;France&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/3/13_Cohabitation_%284%29_-_France_2.html&quot;&gt;Germany&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/3/27_Cohabitation_%286%29_-_Iceland.html&quot;&gt;Iceland&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/4/2_Cohabitation_%286%29_-_Iceland_2.html&quot;&gt;Ireland&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/4/9_Cohabitation_%287%29_-_Ireland_2.html&quot;&gt;Lithuania&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/4/24_Cohabitation_%289%29_-_Lithuania_2.html&quot;&gt;Macedonia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/4/30_Cohabitation_%2810%29_-_Mongolia.html&quot;&gt;Mongolia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/5/12_Cohabitation_%2811%29_-_Niger.html&quot;&gt;Niger&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/5/21_Cohabitation_%2811%29_-_Niger_2.html&quot;&gt;Poland&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/5/28_Cohabitation_%2812%29_-_Poland_2.html&quot;&gt;Portugal&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;perma://BLPageReference/08E24461-8C51-4A27-BB16-BC90FBAE065B&quot;&gt;Romania&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/6/24_Cohabitation_%2814%29_-_Romania_2.html&quot;&gt;Sao Tome&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/9/16_Cohabitation_%2819%29_-_Serbia.html&quot;&gt;Serbia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/7/10_Cohabitation_%2816%29_-_Slovakia.html&quot;&gt;Slovakia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/7/29_Cohabitation_%2816%29_-_Slovakia_2.html&quot;&gt;Slovenia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/8/1_Cohabitation_%2817%29_-_Slovenia_2.html&quot;&gt;Sri Lanka&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>Haiti - PM approved by Chamber of Deputies</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/7_Haiti_-_PM_approved_by_Chamber_of_Deputies.html</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">780910ce-25d4-4b92-b17a-25a6dba9eb1e</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 7 May 2012 21:17:21 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>Haiti has a new PM. Following the vote of the Senate previously, at the end of last week the Chamber of Deputies approved the nomination of Laurent Lamothe.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;According to &lt;a href=&quot;http://radiokiskeya.com/spip.php?article8797&quot;&gt;Radio Kiskeya&lt;/a&gt;, the vote was 62 in favour, 3 against and 2 abstentions. There are 100 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. There is a nice report on the vote &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gpI_LV1UT-zhrv-pLIF0AoUWhJEg?docId=0a0cf83d8cc64c83abe49cec2b739131&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The nomination is all the more interesting because PM Lamothe is a very close personal and political friend of President Martelly, who does not have a strong organised party basis. Therefore, what we are seeing is the extent of the de facto presidential majority in Haiti. In other words, the general degree of support that the president can command over and above party support.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;It is clear that the president enjoys more support in the Chamber of Deputies than in the Senate.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The next step is for PM Lamothe to have his declaration of general policy approved by the two chambers. Normally, the PM investiture vote is the key stage and he has just passed this step. So, the two chambers should approve the declaration. However, there is always the chance that they might not. Therefore, even though Laurent Lamothe is PM, he is not yet sure of being the head of government, if you see what I mean.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;In other words, the saga of appointing the PM/government is not yet over. More to follow.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Other Haiti posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/4/13_Haiti_-_PM_approved_by_the_Senate.html&quot;&gt;13 April 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/3/9_Haiti_-_President_under_pressure.html&quot;&gt;9 March 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/2/27_Haiti_-_PM_officially_approved_2.html&quot;&gt;27 February 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/10/18_Haiti_-_PM_officially_approved.html&quot;&gt;6 October 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/9/19_Haiti_-_When_does_a_premier-presidential_regime_become_president-parliamentary_2.html&quot;&gt;19 September 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/9/13_Haiti_-_President_nominates_a_new_PM_2.html&quot;&gt;13 September 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/9/6_Haiti_-_President_nominates_a_new_PM.html&quot;&gt;6 September 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/8/3_Haiti_-_New_PM_nominated_2.html&quot;&gt;3 August 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/7/7_Haiti_-_New_PM_nominated.html&quot;&gt;7 July 2011&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/6/28_Haiti_-_Confusions_2.html&quot;&gt;28 June 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/5/31_Haiti_-_Confusions.html&quot;&gt;31 May 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/5/24_Haiti_-_Constitutional_amendments_2.html&quot;&gt;24 May 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/5/18_Haiti_-_Constitutional_amendments.html&quot;&gt;18 May 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/4/25_Haiti_-_Presidential_election_2nd_round_2.html&quot;&gt;25 April 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/4/14_Haiti_-_Presidential_election_2nd_round.html&quot;&gt;14 April 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/2/14_Haiti_-_Elections_update.html&quot;&gt;14 February 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/1/4_Haiti_-_Legislative_election.html&quot;&gt;4 January 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/12/8_Haiti_-_Election_timetable_2.html&quot;&gt;8 December 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/7/8_Haiti_-_Election_timetble.html&quot;&gt;8 July 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/3/2_Haiti_-_Government_appointed_2.html&quot;&gt;2 March 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/11/11_Haiti_-_Senate_brings_down_government_2.html&quot;&gt;11 November 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/11/2_Haiti_-_Senate_brings_down_government.html&quot;&gt;2 November 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/10/1_Haiti_-_Proposed_constitutional_amendments.html&quot;&gt;1 October 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/7/1_Haiti_-_Senate_elections_2nd_round.html&quot;&gt;1 July 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/4/29_Haiti_-_Senate_elections.html&quot;&gt;29 April 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/4/3_Haiti_-_Constitutional_Commission.html&quot;&gt;3 April 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/3/5_Haiti_-_Houston,_we_have_a_PM_2.html&quot;&gt;5 March 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/9/8_Haiti_-_Houston,_we_have_a_PM.html&quot;&gt;8 September 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/8/27_Haiti_-_PM_further_problems.html&quot;&gt;27 August 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/8/2_Haiti_PM_-_One_hurdle_crossed_2.html&quot;&gt;2 August 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/25_Haiti_PM_-_One_hurdle_crossed.html&quot;&gt;25 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/17_Haiti_PM_-_Update.html&quot;&gt;17 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/4_Haiti_-_New_PM_candidate.html&quot;&gt;4 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/6/15_Haiti_-_PM_rejected.html&quot;&gt;15 June 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/5/14_Haiti_-_How_%28not%29_to_appoint_a_PM_%282%29.html&quot;&gt;14 May 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/5/7_Haiti_-_How_%28not%29_to_appoint_a_PM.html&quot;&gt;7 May 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/4/29_Haiti_-_new_prime_minister.html&quot;&gt;29 April 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/4/23_Haiti_-_president_under_pressure_to_appoint_a_prime_minister.html&quot;&gt;23 April 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/4/13_Haiti_PM_dismissed_by_the_Senate.html&quot;&gt;13 April 2008&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>Semi-presidentialism on Facebook - Please ‘like’</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/4_New_publications_44.html</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">3a516903-da8e-4301-96b1-f0bd2e6b5194</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 4 May 2012 19:29:16 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>The Semi-Presidential One now has a Facebook page. You can find it at &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.facebook.com/semipresidentialism&quot;&gt;http://www.facebook.com/semipresidentialism&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;By creating the Facebook page, I am going to change slightly the way in which the blog works. I am going to post links to contemporary newspaper articles on the Facebook page, whereas I am going to keep the blog for commentary pieces of my own. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;For example, I will post a link to the latest no-confidence vote in Finland on Facebook. However, on the blog I may do a post on no-confidence votes in semi-presidential countries generally.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;I have made the change for two reasons. Firstly, I come across lots of articles in newspapers that I could blog about, but I don’t get the chance to. So, potentially interesting information goes unreported. Secondly, I find that when I blog about a particular event in a given country, it is sometimes difficult to follow up on subsequent events because if I did so then that country would take over the blog posts. For both reasons, creating the Facebook page gives me the opportunity link to ongoing current events more efficiently.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;There may be slightly fewer blog posts, though I will try to do at least three a week. I will still do the regular slots, such as New Publications.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Please let me know whether this way of doing things is an improvement. If there are ways in which the arrangement could be changed, then do please let me know. If there are things that you would like me to blog about or to post on Facebook, then, again, please let me know. And, as ever, please feel free to comment.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Finally, I would really appreciate it if you would ‘like’ the Facebook page. The more ‘likes’, the more motivated I am!</description>
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      <title>Burkina Faso - Constitutional conundrum</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/3_Burkina_Faso_-_Political_reform_report_2.html</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">3e3ce1cc-eaa3-40a3-aca2-04055fd6acf6</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 3 May 2012 18:20:18 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>There is a constitutional problem in Burkina Faso.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;According to &lt;a href=&quot;http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201204301531.html&quot;&gt;Sidwaya Quotidien&lt;/a&gt;, in March a constitutional law was passed that would have extended the mandate of the National Assembly to no later than 3 June 2013. The mandate was due to expire on 6 May 2012. To ensure that the law was in conformity with the constitution, the President of the National Assembly submitted the law to the Constitutional Council. The Council has now ruled that the law is unconstitutional.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;This creates a crisis because unless the situation is regularised before 6 May, the President of the Republic will have to legislate by decree until elections are held and a new Assembly is convened.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;As I understand it, the aim of extending the mandate of the National Assembly was to ensure that legislative and municipal elections would be held at the same time later this year or early next year.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The Council struck down the law because it claimed that constitutional laws have to be general in nature and not specific. The Court’s decision is final.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Previous Burkina Faso posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/7/22_Burkina_Faso_-_New_PM_2.html&quot;&gt;22 July 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;20 April 2011&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/4/15_Burkina_Faso_-_Regime_trouble.html&quot;&gt;15 April 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/11/25_Burkina_Faso_-_Presidential_election.html&quot;&gt;25 November 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/8/9_Togo_-_Opposition_joins_government_2.html&quot;&gt;6 August 2010&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>Russia - Direct election of governors</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/2_Russia_-_Direct_election_of_governors.html</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">2bf1e7a3-82d1-4a3e-be0b-4ced6b5ad8f0</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 2 May 2012 17:08:53 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>The Russian parliament has approved the re-introduction of the direct election of regional governors. They were directly elected until 2004, after which time they were appointed by Moscow.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;It is not entirely clear to me how the electoral process will work. However, there is some detail in the &lt;a href=&quot;http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/7799930.html&quot;&gt;People’s Daily&lt;/a&gt;. It states: “To be registered as a candidate, one must receive support of 5-10 percent of municipal lawmakers in at least three-fourths of municipalities in a region, which Russian political analysts called the &amp;quot;municipal filters&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;municipal primaries&amp;quot;. The law also envisages that one can stay in office for only two consecutive terms, and leaves the governor's electoral threshold for regional parliaments to establish.”&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;According to the report, the first elections will be held in three regions in October this year.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;This reform is doubly interesting, because prior to the 2004 reform many Russian regions had semi-presidential constitutions. Previous posts on this topic are available from &lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/9/1_SP_in_disputed_areas_and_other_territories_%2813%29_-_Kurdistan_Region_of_Iraq_2.html&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;. My assumption is that this new reform will restore semi-presidentialism from a constitutional point of view.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Previous Russia posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/3/6_Russia_-_Parliamentary_election_2.html&quot;&gt;6 March 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/12/7_Russia_-_Parliamentary_election.html&quot;&gt;7 December 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/11/29_Russia_-_Putin_endorsed_as_United_Russia_presidential_candidate.html&quot;&gt;29 November 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/9/26_Russia_-_Putin_to_return_as_president.html&quot;&gt;26 September 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.dcu.ie/&quot;&gt;4 August 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/5/26_Russia_-_President_PM_rivalry_2.html&quot;&gt;26 May 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/5/9_Russia_-_Moscow_mayor_appointed_2.html&quot;&gt;9 May 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/10/27_Russia_-_Local_and_regional_elections_3.html&quot;&gt;27 October 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;13 October 2010&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/9/30_Russia_-_Local_and_regional_elections_2.html&quot;&gt;30 September 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/3/17_Russia_-_Putin_signals_return_to_the_presidency_2.html&quot;&gt;13 March 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;10 December 2009&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/10/13_Russia_-_Succession_speculation_2.html&quot;&gt;13 October 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/11/13_Russia_-_Presidential_inauguration_and_appointment_of_PM_2.html&quot;&gt;13 November 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/5/11_Russia_-_Presidential_inauguration_and_appointment_of_PM.html&quot;&gt;11 May 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/4/14_Russia_-_Weak_president,_strong_PM%28for_a_while_at_least%29.html&quot;&gt;14 April 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/3/3_Putin_-_From_President_to_PM.html&quot;&gt;3 March 2008 1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/3/3_Election_results_-_Russia_%28presidential%29.html&quot;&gt;3 March 2008&lt;/a&gt; 2</description>
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      <title>DRC - New PM</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/5/1_DRC_-_Formateur_appointed_2.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 1 May 2012 16:33:16 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>The Democratic Republic of Congo has a new prime minister. He is Augustin Matata Ponyo. He was previously the Finance Minister. He is from the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD), which is President Kabila’s party.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The full list of government ministers in French is available here. The main news is that the number of ministers has declined from 46 to 36. In addition, there seem to be more technocrats in the government than had been envisaged previously. There is a report at Jeune Afrique &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/DEPAFP20120429111212/joseph-kabila-rdc-legislatives-rdc-2011-augustin-matata-ponyordc-nomination-d-un-nouveau-gouvernement-resserre-peu-politique.html&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Other DRC posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/3/15_DRC_-_Formateur_appointed.html&quot;&gt;15 March 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/2/16_DRC_-_Presidential_election_2.html&quot;&gt;16 February 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/12/12_DRC_-_Presidential_election.html&quot;&gt;12 December 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/3/2_DRC_-_Constitutional_amendment_2.html&quot;&gt;2 March 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/1/18_DRC_-_Cabinet_reshuffle_2.html&quot;&gt;18 January 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/2/22_DRC_-_Cabinet_reshuffle.html&quot;&gt;22 February 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/9/25_DRC_-_New_PM_2.html&quot;&gt;25 September 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/10/14_DRC_-_Controversy_over_PM_2.html&quot;&gt;14 October 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/10/8_DRC_-_Controversy_over_PM.html&quot;&gt;8 October 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/9/29_DRC_-_PM_resigns.html&quot;&gt;29 September 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/6/27_DRC_-_PM_about_to_resign.html&quot;&gt;27 June 2008&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>Romania - Government loses no-confidence vote</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/4/30_Romania_-_New_government_wins_confidence_vote_2.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 19:27:26 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>In Romania, the government of Prime Minister Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu lost a vote of no-confidence on Friday.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;A vote of no-confidence needs the support of an absolute majority of all deputies and senators combined, or 231 votes.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The motion on Friday was a general one entitled ‘'Stop the Blackmail-Prone Government! Never This Way!’. The government is a coalition of President Traian Băsescu’s Democratic Liberal party (PDL) and the Hungarian UDMR party. The motion was lodged by the opposition Social Democrats (PSD) and National Liberals (PNL).&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;According to &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.agerpres.ro/english/index.php/news-of-the-day/item/118613-Censure-motion-has-been-adopted-Government-has-fallen.html&quot;&gt;Agerpress&lt;/a&gt;, the no-confidence motion obtained 235 votes. So, the government has fallen.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Immediately, President Băsescu held discussions with all the parliamentary groups. President Băsescu has now designated the leader of the PSD, Victor Ponta, as the PM-designate.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The investiture vote will take place on 7 May. Art. 103-3 of the Constitution states that “The programme and list of the Government shall be debated upon by the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, in joint session. Parliament shall grant confidence to the Government by a majority vote of Deputies and Senators.”&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;If the investiture vote is successful, then presumably this will bring about a period of cohabitation as the PDL is unlikely to be part of the coalition. In this event, this will be the second time that Romania has experienced cohabitation. For the previous cohabitation, also under President Băsescu, see &lt;a href=&quot;perma://BLPageReference/08E24461-8C51-4A27-BB16-BC90FBAE065B&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Other Romania posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/2/13_Romania_-_PM_resigns_2.html&quot;&gt;13 February 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/2/7_Romania_-_PM_resigns.html&quot;&gt;7 February 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/1/19_Romania_-_Government_under_pressure.html&quot;&gt;19 January 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/12/23_Romania_-_Government_defeats_no-confidence_motion.html&quot;&gt;23 December 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/11/24_Romania_-_President_of_Senate_voted_out_of_office.html&quot;&gt;24 November 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/10/5_Romania_-_President_presents_constitutional_amendments_2.html&quot;&gt;5 October 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/6/2_Romania_-_President_presents_constitutional_amendments.html&quot;&gt;14 June 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/3/30_Romania_-_Veto_of_the_President%E2%80%99s_veto_vetoed.html&quot;&gt;30 March 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/3/18_Romania_-_No-confidence_motion_receives_0_votes_2.html&quot;&gt;18 March 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/12/29_Romania_-_Government_survives_no-confidence_motion_2.html&quot;&gt;29 December 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/12/21_Romania_-_Court_rules_against_the_government_2.html&quot;&gt;21 December 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/11/10_Romania_-_President_vetoes_two_bills_2.html&quot;&gt;10 November 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/11/3_Romania_-_President_vetoes_two_bills.html&quot;&gt;3 November 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/11/3_Romania_-_President_vetoes_two_bills.html&quot;&gt;28 October 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/9/13_Romania_-_Government_reshuffle.html&quot;&gt;13 September 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2010/1/6_Romania_-_New_%28old%29_PM_nominated_2.html&quot;&gt;6 January 2010&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/12/18_Romania_-_Presidential_election_2nd_round_2.html&quot;&gt;18 December 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/12/8_Romania_-_2nd_round_dealing_2.html&quot;&gt;8 December 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/11/26_Romania_-_2nd_round_dealing.html&quot;&gt;26 November 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/11/24_Romania_-_Presidential_election_1st_round.html&quot;&gt;24 November 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/11/5_Romania_-_Another_government,_another_no-confidence_vote_lost.html&quot;&gt;5 November 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/10/14_Romania_-_New_government_defeated.html&quot;&gt;14 October 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/10/2_Romania_-_Censure_motion_fails,_president_proposes_reforms_2.html&quot;&gt;2 October 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/9/28_Romania_-_Presidential_poll_2.html&quot;&gt;28 September 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/9/8_Romania_-_Presidential_poll.html&quot;&gt;8 September 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/6/10_Romania_-_EP_election.html&quot;&gt;10 June 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/2/24_Romania_-_President_wants_a_semi-presidential_system.html&quot;&gt;24 February 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/1/19_Romania_-_Update.html&quot;&gt;19 January 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/12/16_Romania_-_A_new_prospective_PM.html&quot;&gt;16 December 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/12/11_Romania_-_Legislative_election_2.html&quot;&gt;11 December 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/12/5_Romania_-_Legislative_election_%28seats%29.html&quot;&gt;5 December 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/12/3_Lithuania_-_Legislative_election_%282nd_round%29_2.html&quot;&gt;3 December 2008&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>Mongolia - Presidential veto</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/4/27_Mongolia_-_New_electoral_system_debated_2.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 08:27:19 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>As ever, information is difficult to come by, but it seems as if the president of Mongolia, Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, has vetoed a bill.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;According to &lt;a href=&quot;http://mongoliaeconomy.blogspot.com/2012/03/standing-committee-backs-presidents.html&quot;&gt;Mongolia Economy and Finance&lt;/a&gt;, in March President Elbegdorj vetoed the Law on regulating public and private interests in the public service and preventing conflicts of interests. The report also states that he partially vetoed the bill in February.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Art. 33 of the constitution states that the president has the power: “to exercise a right to veto against all or part of laws and other decisions adopted by the State lkh Khural. The laws or decisions shall remain in force if two thirds of the members of the State Ikh Khural present in the session do not accept the President's veto”. So, partial vetoes are a possibility.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;All of that said, I have not been able to corroborate this story from another source.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Other Mongolia posts:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/7/12_Mongolia_-_Presidential_vetoes_2.html&quot;&gt;12 July 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2011/2/21_Mongolia_-_Presidential_vetoes.html&quot;&gt;21 February 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/11/3_Mongolia_-_Presidential_election_2.html&quot;&gt;3 November 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/5/26_Mongolia_update_2.html&quot;&gt;26 May 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/4/30_Cohabitation_%2810%29_-_Mongolia.html&quot;&gt;30 April 2009&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/9/3_Election_dates_and_Mongolia_update.html&quot;&gt;3 September 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/30_Mongolia_update.html&quot;&gt;30 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/2_Mongolia_election_update.html&quot;&gt;2 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/7/1_Upcoming_election_-_Mongolia_2.html&quot;&gt;1 July 2008&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2008/6/20_Upcoming_election_-_Mongolia.html&quot;&gt;20 June 2008&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>Nepal - Update</title>
      <link>http://www.semipresidentialism.com/The_Semi-presidential_One/Blog/Entries/2012/4/26_Nepal_-_Update.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Apr 2012 18:35:36 +0100</pubDate>
      <description>Two articles in &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/&quot;&gt;The Kathmandu Post&lt;/a&gt; provide a brief update about the constitutional situation in Nepal.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2012/04/24/nation/maoists-for-mixed-model-with-directly-elected-prez/234144.html&quot;&gt;first&lt;/a&gt; confirms that the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) is still insisting on a directly elected president. With collective cabinet responsibility a given, this would lead to a semi-presidential system, or as it is known in Nepal, a mixed government. However, they seem to want a strong presidency and a “nominal” PM “who performs administrative duties”.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2012/04/24/top-story/parliamentary-system--top-nc-leaders-asked-not-to-give-up-stance/234127.html&quot;&gt;second&lt;/a&gt; reports that the Nepali Congress is reiterating its preference for a parliamentary system. However, there seems to be some support for the idea that a semi-presidential system could be acceptable as a last resort but only “if the power sharing places the PM in a position more powerful than the president”.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;So, while there seem to be competing views, there is still a good chance that Nepal will, eventually, adopt semi-presidentialism.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Previous posts on Nepal&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2012/1/2_Nepal_-_Semi-presidentialism_being_discussed_2.html&quot;&gt;2 January 2012&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;Entries/2009/12/11_Russia_-_Putin_signals_return_to_the_presidency_2.html&quot;&gt;11 December 2009&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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