This post relates to a real hobbyhorse of mine. Iceland (like Ireland, Austria, Slovenia etc) is often not considered to be semi-presidential because the president is weak. Yes, undoubtedly, the president in Iceland and these other countries is weak. However, there comes a point when some or other political situation will provoke even the weakest president to use the powers that s/he has. When s/he does so, does that suddenly make the country (Iceland, Ireland in 1976 and the Donegan affair, Sampaio’s 2004 dissolution in Portugal etc) semi-presidential because the president is ‘quite powerful’? Of course it doesn’t. Or, rather, it does if you take a behavioural definition of semi-presidentialism, i.e. if you assume semi-presidentialism requires there to be a president who behaves ‘quite powerfully’. By contrast, if like this blog, you adopt a constitutional definition, then, whether the president is usually weak, strong, or competing for power, a country is always semi-presidential (or at least for as long as it meets the constitutional requirements for same). According to this perspective, what needs to be explained is why presidential power varies within a semi-presidential constitution, not whether or not a president is powerful enough for a country to be called semi-presidential. So, please let’s not have any more conference papers on that latter topic!

Anyway, back to the point of this post!

In Iceland, President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson has vetoed the controversial ‘Icesave’ bill. This is a bill that authorised the repayment of $5 billion to British and Dutch investors who were left out of pocket when Iceland’s banks collapsed last year. This is an unpopular bill and no fewer than 56,089 people, or 23 per cent of the population, signed a petition urging the president to veto any bill. Well, the bill, proposed by the Social Democrat/Left-Green coalition, was passed earlier this week only for President Grímsson to veto it. In a poll reported in The Reykjavík Grapevine 51 per cent said that they opposed the president’s veto, but 67% believed that the government should withdraw the current bill and submit a new one to the legislature rather than hold a referendum. In a report in Morgunblaðið, 53 per cent of those polled said that they would support the bill in a referendum.

For the record, Art. 26 of Iceland’s constitution states: “If Althingi has passed a bill, it shall be submitted to the President of the Republic for confirmation not later than two weeks after it has been passed. Such confirmation gives it the force of law. If the President rejects a bill, it shall nevertheless become valid but shall, as soon as circumstances permit, be submitted to a vote by secret ballot of all those eligible to vote, for approval or rejection. The law shall become void if rejected, but otherwise retains its force.” So, technically, the Icesave bill is now law unless it is rejected in a referendum.

The Reykjavík Grapevine reports that this is only the second time that a president has vetoed legislation, the first being in 2004, and also by President Grímsson, regarding a media bill. There was no referendum then, because, as I understand it, the government withdrew the law before any vote was held. The same may happen this time around. Indeed, in another post, The Reykjavík Grapevine reports that legislation would be needed to organise the holding of any referendum, though 20 February is being reported as the tentative date for the vote.

The cohesion of the coalition government has been strained by the affair. Some elements of the Left-Green Movement voted against the Icesave bill. President Grímsson was formerly a member of the People’s Alliance, which was eventually dissolved with some members joining the Social democrats and some forming the Left-Green Movement. President Grímsson was also previously the Professor of Political Science at the University of Iceland.