New publications

Robert Elgie, review of Margit Tavits, Presidents in Parliamentary Systems: Do Direct Elections Matter? in Perspectives on Politics, March 2012, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 207-209.

Claudia Gilia, ‘Is Romania Heading Towards a Presidential Republic?’, Acta Universitatis Danubius. Juridica, vol. 9, no. 1/2013, pp. 89-98. Available at: http://journals.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/juridica

Camelia Tomescu and Mihaela Codrina Levai, ‘The Principle Of Equilibrium And Separation Of Powers Under The Romanian Constitution’, The USV Annals of Economics and Public Administration, Volume 12, Issue 1(15), 2012, available at: http://seap.usv.ro/annals/ojs/index.php/annals/article/viewArticle/483

Anita Sengupta, ‘Colour Revolutions and Constitutionalism. The Case of Kyrgyzstan’, in Pınar Akçalı and Cennet Engin-Demir (eds.), Politics, Identity and Education in Central Asia. Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 52-68.

Seçil Öraz, ‘The Impact of Askar Akaev’s Political Leadership in the Process of Democratization in Kyrgyzstan’, in Pınar Akçalı and Cennet Engin-Demir (eds.), Politics, Identity and Education in Central Asia. Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 33-51.

Ol’ga V. Kryshtanovskaia
, ‘Formats of Russian State Power’, Russian Politics and Law, vol. 50, no. 3, May–June 2012, pp. 7–17.

Dieter Nohlen, ‘Gobernabilidad y reformas institucionales en México. Perspectivas comparadas’, in Quid Juris. Available at: http://www.techihuahua.org.mx/attachments/178_3-3.pdf

Jonathan Goodhand, ‘Sri Lanka in 2012: Securing the State, Enforcing the “Peace”’, Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 1, February 2013, pp. 64-72.

Michael Leach, ‘Timor-Leste in 2012: Beyond International Statebuilding?’, Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 1, February 2013, pp. 156-161.

Ming-Tong Chen, ‘Taiwan in 2012: Curse of the Second-Term President’, Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 1, February 2013, pp. 206-213.

Gordon M. Hahn, ‘Russia in 2012: From “Thaw” and “Reset” to “Freeze President’, Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 1, February 2013, pp. 214-223.

Raymond Kuhn, ‘The French Presidential And Parliamentary Elections, 2012’, Representation, 2013, Vol. 49, No. 1, 97–114

Tim Haughton and Alenka Krasovec, ‘The 2011 parliamentary elections in Slovenia’, Electoral Studies, 32:1, 2013, 201-203.

Montenegro – Presidential election

In Montenegro, the presidential election was held on Sunday. There were only two candidates. They were the incumbent, Filip Vujanović, of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and Miodrag Lekić, who headed what is called the Democratic Front coalition, bringing together three opposition parties and other groups. He has a recent background as an ambassador and university professor. He is often classed as an independent.

The opinion polls had all shown that President Vujanović would be easily returned. He was first elected in 2003 and then re-elected in 2008. The 2007 Montenegrin constitution limits the president to two terms. However, because his first election occurred prior to the new constitution, he was deemed eligible to stand for re-election again.

The vote was extremely close and the result was highly contested. Almost immediately after the polls had closed both candidates claimed they had won. There was a delay in the official announcement of the result. However, yesterday the Electoral Commission officially declared that President Vujanović had been re-elected, winning 51.2% of the vote.

The initial OSCE statement has criticised some aspects of the election, but not the count.

Is Peru really semi-presidential?

Is Peru semi-presidential. The answer is obviously ‘yes’. But is Peru really semi-presidential? That’s the question.

In previous posts I have discussed semi-presidentialism in Peru. Both the 1979 and 1993 constitutions clearly make the head of government and cabinet collectively responsible to the legislature. Art. 132 states: “Congress makes effective the political liability of the Cabinet or of each Minister individually through a vote of no confidence or by defeating a vote of confidence  … A censured Cabinet or Minister must resign. The President of the Republic accepts the resignation within the subsequent 72 hours.” This is pretty much as semi-presidential as you can get.

However, some people have difficulty calling Peru semi-presidential. It has a strong president. It is also situated in an oasis of Latin American presidentialism. Here, though, the issue I am interested in is whether Art. 132 is ever invoked. In practice, is the cabinet ever removed by parliament?

I am no Peru expert, but there is some context that might be relevant. Firstly, my understanding is that political parties in Peru are relatively ill-disciplined and that presidents do not have a secure and stable majority in Congress. These seem to be the conditions where the legislature is likely to bring down the cabinet. Secondly, there is a quick turnover of PMs in Peru. The average lifespan is six months. So, even if most of these changes are purely presidential, has Congress ever voted down a government?

Well, those who follow my Facebook page may be aware that last month the legislature tabled a motion of censure against the PM. There is a report here. In the end, the motion was withdrawn, but it shows that they can be tabled.

I then did some digging and found some other evidence. In October 2008 Congress tabled a motion of censure against the then PM Jorge del Castillo, who was accused of corruption allegations. However, before the vote could be held the PM handed in the government’s resignation to President Alan García. So, even if the PM was not defeated, the threat of a motion of no-confidence seems to have tipped the balance.

In addition, in June 2009 there was a motion of censure against the then PM Yehude Simon. The censure motion needed 61 votes to pass, but received only 56. So, the PM survived. However, he resigned on 11 July.

I have also found mention of a similar situation in January 2005. This time the censure motion against PM Carlos Ferrero received only 43 votes. He stayed on as PM until August.

There may be other examples and there may be examples where the censure motion has been successful. However, I have not had the time to do much digging. The bottom line, though, is that not only is Peru semi-presidential, it is really semi-presidential.

Romania – President Băsescu vows to create a new right-wing political movement

Guest post from Cristina Bucur

The biggest opposition party in Romania, President Băsescu’s Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), held internal elections on March 23. Three candidates entered the race for the presidency of the party. Vasile Blaga, the incumbent leader, who was supported by the majority of local organisations and by most of the party’s elephants; Elena Udrea, a minister of tourism in Emil Boc’s government (2008-2012), who earned the support of considerably fewer local organisations but was backed up by President Băsescu and by the former prime minister; and Monica Macovei, who had only relatively recently joined the party but who was well-known for her anti-corruption campaigns as a justice minister in the coalition government formed by the Democrats (PD) and the National Liberals (PNL) in 2004 and then as a PDL MEP.

In the election, Vasile Blaga won a narrow victory at the first ballot, managing to pass the 50% threshold by just 44 votes. As she won only a few hundred votes fewer than Blaga, Udrea appealed the result but after a recount Blaga was elected. Macovei obtained about 3% of the delegates’ votes.

Displeased with the result and the procedural irregularities that prevented a second round of voting, President Băsescu announced his unequivocal separation from his former party. In a video message posted on his Facebook account shortly after the closing of the Convention, Băsescu accused the PDL of undemocratic practices and announced that they had parted ways for good.

The explanation for President Băsescu’s reaction to the defeat of his preferred candidate can be found in the evolution of the leadership contests in the PD/PDL after 2004, when he stepped down as party leader to become president of Romania. Following his election, Băsescu designated the ultra-loyal Emil Boc as his successor as the president of the Democratic Party. Boc ran unchallenged in the following year’s Convention and was almost unanimously elected as president by more than 3,500 party delegates. Following the break-up of the PNL-PD governing coalition in April 2007, the PD went into opposition. When the PD and a splinter group from the PNL merged in December 2007 to form the PDL, the leadership of the two parties chose Emil Boc as the leader of the new organisation. When the PDL won the 2008 general election and returned to power, Băsescu appointed Boc as prime minister. In this way, President Băsescu could finally count on the backing of a strong presidential party that was ready to serve as his personal power base.

The next internal elections in the PDL were organised in 2011. The leadership selection process had not undergone any significant changes compared to the Democratic Party’s previous internal contests. The central leadership’s full freedom to decide on the number of delegates representing each local organisation had done little to increase the competitiveness of internal elections and the inclusiveness of the party selectorate. In 2011, though, Emil Boc was already experiencing the negative effects of the economic crisis that his government had constantly had to deal with since 2008 and his popularity was declining rapidly. However, Boc was still backed by President Băsescu who fully endorsed the government’s austerity measures. Thus, although his leadership was challenged by Vasile Blaga, one of the party’s most senior members and the speaker of the Senate, Boc was still able to obtain twice as many votes from the party delegates at the 2011 Convention than his main rival.

However, two events triggered the organisation of new intraparty elections just one year later. First, the coalition government between the PDL and the Hungarian minority party (UDMR) collapsed in early February, following several weeks of street protests that had been triggered by austerity cuts. Second, the party suffered a crushing defeat in the 2012 local elections and obtained about 15% of the vote. Much to President Băsescu’s displeasure, Emil Boc was constrained to step down as party leader and new intraparty elections were organised. Boc’s refusal to run for a new mandate allowed Vasile Blaga to win the presidency of the party with an overwhelming majority. However, the leadership change did not lead to an improvement in the party’s electoral performance and the PDL suffered another defeat in the general election that took place in December 2012. This time the party’s vote share shrank from 32% in 2008 to little more than 16%. Vasile Blaga refused to assume responsibility for the electoral defeat and resisted all calls for his resignation. As a result, another national Convention was scheduled in March 2013 for the election of a new leadership.

Traian Băsescu’s involvement in the internal party campaign that preceded the PDL’s 2013 Convention was not limited to lending support to Elena Udrea’s candidacy. He also condemned the previous year’s overthrow of Emil Boc and criticised the new leadership’s inability to improve the party’s score in the 2012 general election. While he addressed the PDL Convention, Băsescu urged the party delegates to make as radical a change as they had done in 2001, when his own election ended the ten-year leadership of Petre Roman, who was no longer able to assure the party’s electoral growth. Băsescu also affirmed that he intended to come back to active party politics when his presidential term ended in 2014 and contribute to the return of a strong right-wing party to power after the 2016 general election. Finally, in his farewell message to the party following the re-election of the leader who was not able to deliver an electoral victory in the 2012 contest, President Băsescu affirmed his determination to pursue this course of action outside the PDL

Cristina Bucur

Dublin City University

cristina.bucur2@mail.dcu.ie

http://dcu.academia.edu/CristinaBucur

Macedonia – Government tops the poll at local elections

Local elections were held in Macedonia at the weekend. They took place against a background of political crisis that started late last year. At one time, the opposition Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) party had threatened to boycott the local elections. However, Balkan Insight reports that a few weeks ago a deal was reached between the opposition and the ruling Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO–DPMNE) party whereby the opposition would contest the local elections in return for the government holding talks about holding an early general election. This was one of the main demands of the opposition. Anyway, the local elections were held at the weekend and, as this context suggests, they were more politically significant than perhaps some local elections at other times.

The Macedonian Information Centre is reporting that the turnout was a very respectable 57.6%, which was somewhat higher than the 2009 figure. So, it appears as if the opposition voters did go to the polls. However, the results show that the government has done very well. The official report states that the ruling VMRO-DPMNE topped the poll in 54 municipalities, the SDSM led in 7, the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (BDI) party led in 12, while five other smaller parties led in one municipality each and independents in two. It is a two-round electoral system. So, there will be a second round in two weeks times.

Commenting on the results last night, the leader of the opposition SDSM party, former President of Macedonia and a former PM, Branko Crvenkovski, has hinted that the opposition may boycott the second round of the election. However, external observers are quoted as saying that the number of electoral irregularities was small. There is a report on the results at Balkan Insight here.

Georgia – Reduction in presidential power

In Georgia the game of cohabitation cat and mouse between the ruling Georgia Dream party and the opposition UNM is becoming more and more bizarre.

Georgia Dream fear that the president will dismiss the government. In this event, because the presidential election is relatively close, the constitution would allow the president to appoint a government that does not need the support of parliament. Therefore, they fear that President Saakashvili will use his power to replace the current government with one of his own and that they will be powerless to stop him.

In this context, Georgia Dream proposed a constitutional amendment that would take away from the president the power to appoint a new government in the current circumstances, meaning that even if he did dismiss the government it would still remain in power until the presidential election. Confusing, isn’t it?

Anyway, the president’s UNM party opposed the amendment, saying that there was no need for it because the president had no intention of dismissing the government. Georgia Dream’s problem is that they need 100 votes to pass the constitutional amendment, but they have the support of only around 93 deputies.

This week, the amendment was coming up for debate in parliament. In a move that I have never come across before, the UNM leadership in parliament said that they wanted a ‘test vote’ prior to the vote on the bill proper. Basically, they wanted to demonstrate that the government did not have enough votes to pass the bill on its own and that, therefore, the bill would only pass because the UNM supported it. By this tactic, the UNM was trying to make sure that if they did vote for the bill and it did pass, then Georgia Dream could not claim that the bill would have passed anyway because sufficient UNM deputies had defected and allowed the bill to go through. Complicated, no?

Anyway, Civil.ge reports that the debate was held yesterday. Even though Georgia Dream had opposed the idea of a ‘test vote’, they allowed it. The vote showed that, indeed, they did not have enough support on their own to pass the amendment. There was then a proper vote on the bill. The UNM voted for the reform and it passed unanimously. Therefore, the UNM could claim that it was being responsible and that President Saakashvili was not opposed to a reduction in his powers. They also demonstrated that their support was needed for any future, and perhaps more controversial, constitutional amendments.

So, has there been an outbreak of consensus? The answer is no. Civil.ge reports that President Saakashvili made a televised address immediately after the vote. The language he used in the vote, likening the government to “Russian gangsters of 1990s”, did not sound consensual. So, Georgia’s conflictual cohabitation goes on.

As I understand it, this was the first vote on the constitutional amendments and two further votes are needed before it passes. It will be interesting to see whether the UNM will continue to support the reform.

New publications

Philipp Köker, Presidential Activism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): A statistical analysis of the use of presidential vetoes in the CEE EU member states, 1990-2010, available at: http://www.psa.ac.uk/2013/UploadedPaperPDFs/52_30.pdf

Jae-Jae Spoon and Karleen Jones West, ‘Alone or together? How institutions affect party entry in presidential elections in Europe and South America’, Party Politics, published online 18 February 2013

David J. Samuels & Matthew S. Shugart, ‘Party “capacity” in new democracies: how executive format affects the recruitment of presidents and prime ministers’, Democratization, DOI:10.1080/13510347.2012.757695

Dag Anckar, ‘Traces Of Westminster? Government Style In Former African And Asian British Colonies’, in Smita Srivastava and Somesh Srivastava (eds.), Governance in Afro Asian Countries: Challenges and Approaches, available at: http://seersbooksonline.com/books/ebook32.pdf

Asem Khalil, ‘ Beyond the written constitution: Constitutional crisis of, and the institutional deadlock in, the Palestinian political system as entrenched in the basic law’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, (2013), Vol. 11 No. 1, 34–73.

John Gaffney, ‘Presidents Behaving Badly: Poor Leadership and Bad Governance in France’, in Ludger Helms (ed.), Poor Leadership And Bad Governance: Reassessing Presidents and Prime Ministers in North America, Europe and Japan, Edward Elgar, 2012.

Richard Sakwa, ‘Leadership, Governance and Statecraft in Russia’, in Ludger Helms (ed.), Poor Leadership And Bad Governance: Reassessing Presidents and Prime Ministers in North America, Europe and Japan, Edward Elgar, 2012.

Sten Hagberg and Gabriella Körling, Socio-political Turmoil in Mali: The Public Debate Following the Coup d’État on 22 March 2012, Africa Spectrum, 2-3/2012, pp. 111-125, available at: http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/viewFile/553/551

Florent Gougou and Simon Labouret, ‘Revisiting data on the 2012 French legislative elections: Political supply, party competition and territorial divisions’, French Politics, vol. 11, no. 1, 2013, pp. 73-97.

Slovenia – New coalition agreed

The long-running governmental crisis in Slovenia looks like it has been resolved. Late last night four parties signed a coalition agreement. This will now be voted on in parliament.

The previous government headed by Janez Janša of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) slowly disintegrated in the face of corruption accusations against the PM. The PM refused to stand down. Gradually, one coalition party after another left the government. Finally, on 26 February PM Janša was replaced by Alenka Bratušek of the Positive Slovenia party in a constructive vote of no-confidence.

PM-designate Bratušek had 15 days to propose a new government. Last night, an agreement was reached between Positive Slovenia (PS), the Social Demsocrats, the Citizens’ List (DL) and the Pensioners’ Party (DeSUS). According to the figures on the National Assembly website, if all these parties vote for the government, then it will have the support of 49 deputies in the 90-seat Assembly.

There is, however, one potential problem. There are reports that DeSUS may be on the verge of splitting. The party leader has suspended his membership. It is not clear to me whether or not the division is related to the process of government formation. If it is not, which is probably the case, then both groups could still support the government. Anyway, there will be a vote in the next few days.

With President Borut Pahor being from the Social Democrats, Slovenia had been experiencing a period of cohabitation since his inauguration on 23 December 2012. However, if the proposed government does come to power, then the period of cohabitation will end.

Cohabitation – Czech Republic

This is a series of posts that records the cases of cohabitation in countries with semi-presidential constitutions. Cohabitation is defined as the situation where the president and prime minister are from different parties and where the president’s party is not represented in the cabinet. Presidents classed as non-party cannot generate any periods of cohabitation.

Here is my list of cohabitations in the Czech Republic:

March 2013 – July 2013
President – Miloš Zeman (Party of Civic Rights – Zeman’s people, SPOZ); PM – Petr Nečas (Civic Democratic Party, ODS); Coalition – ODS, TOP 09, LIDEM

 

Countries that have debated introducing semi-presidentialism – Hungary

This is another in a series of occasional posts on countries that have actively debated introducing a semi-presidential constitution, but that eventually decided not to do so.

In the rush to democratisation in Central and Easter Europe in the late 1980s/early 1990s, Hungary very nearly adopted semi-presidentialism. I am no expert on Hungary (so comments are welcome), but there seems to have been a two-stage process.

Hungary was one of the early democratisers in 1989. As I understand it, one of the reforms introduced by the old regime was the direct election of the president. This election was scheduled to take place on 3 December 1989. However, the democratic opposition to the regime was concerned that it would not be able to compete effectively and that Imre Pozsgay would be elected. Pozsgay had played a major role in reforming the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, but the opposition considered that his victory would have legitimised the old regime in its new form. In November 1989 the opposition was able to force a referendum at which voters were asked to decide whether the presidential election should take place in December or be delayed until after parliamentary elections scheduled for 1990. The vote was very close and the delay was approved by 2,145,023 votes to 2,138,619.

Parliamentary elections took place March 1990. Unlike most other countries, Hungary did not immediately adopt a new constitution. Instead, the old constitution was reformed. As part of this incremental process another referendum was held on July 1990 about whether or not to introduce the direct election of the president. This would have made Hungary semi-presidential. There was an overwhelming majority for the proposal (85.9%), but turnout was only 14% and so the result was invalid. Therefore, Hungary continued to elect its president indirectly and remained parliamentary.

So, Moldova and Hungary, if memory serves me correctly, are the only two countries to have rejected the direct election of the president in a referendum. On both occasions, this was due to low turnout.