Category Archives: Ukraine

Ukraine

Ukraine – About to abandon SP?

Ukrainian Journal suggests that Ukraine may be about to abandon semi-presidentialism.

Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s party and the Regions Party of Viktor Yanukovych have been in discussion about constitutional reforms. The report in Ukrainian Journal says that 90% of issues have been agreed between the two parties. However, the crucial issue of whether the president should be directly elected or elected by parliament remains outstanding.

A clue as to what the final decision might be is contained in the article, which reports an opinion poll that indicated both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych would be defeated in a presidential election run-off by Arseniy Yatseniuk, who was dismissed as the Speaker of parliament in November 2008 and who is supposedly about to form his own party. Were the president to be elected by parliament, then it would be easier for Tymoshenko and Yanukovych to agree a deal. Currently, they have the support of slightly more than 300 of the 450 seats in the Rada. A constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds majority.

The negotiations between the Tymoshenko bloc and the Regions Party do not appear to be involving President Yushchenko or his party. Bear in mind that the Regions Party is, officially, an opposition party and that Yulia Tymoshenko is in coalition with some of the supporters of President Yushchenko. So, the situation is complex and wonderfully machiavellian.

Ukraine – Semi-presidential history

In a previous post I referred to some of the difficulties involved in determining when a country should start to be classed as semi-presidential. As someone who does not speak Russian, I find this issue particularly problematic in the case of former USSR countries. Most simply grafted a directly elected president onto a nominally parliamentary system in 1990-91. In this way, they probably became semi-presidential at that time. However, it is extremely difficult to find the texts from this period in order to confirm this situation and, if they are available, the texts are usually in Russian. Therefore, I tend to date the start of semi-presidentialism from the time of the first consolidated constitution. These are generally available.

The case of Ukraine is interesting in terms of its semi-presidential history. I only had the opportunity to become familiar with this case when I was examining a PhD by Eugene Mazo late last year. Anyway, one of the things I learnt from the PhD was that Ukraine was not semi-presidential, as defined in this blog, from June 1995 until the passage of the current constitution in June 1996.

The first presidential election in Ukraine was held on 1 December 1991, just a few months after the declaration of independence in August of that year. So, Ukraine became semi-presidential during that period.

By June 1995 the constitution-making process had already been going on for nearly four years. A problem was that any constitution had to be passed by a 2/3rds majority of all members. Moreover, elections failed to return a full set of deputies. So, the supermajority requirement was insuperable.

In June 1995 an agreement was reached between the president and parliament to pass an interim constitution by way of an ordinary law, hence avoiding the supermajority requirement. This so-called ‘constitutional agreement’ created a presidential regime. It was in force until the end of June 1996. During that time, the president could not dissolve the assembly; the president could appoint the government without parliamentary approval; and parliament could not dismiss the government.

At the end of June 1996 with the deadline looming a full constitution was finally agreed. This constitution was, of course, semi-presidential.

Therefore, there is a one-year gap in Ukraine’s semi-presidential history.

There are publications by Eugene Mazo available at: http://cesp.stanford.edu/people/eugenemazo.html.

Ukraine – New government update

As reported in a previous post a coalition deal has been reached in Ukraine that sees Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko remain in office. The deal brings together her own party, the small Lytvyn People’s Bloc and President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine-People’s Self-defense group, or at least some of the members of this group. Ukrainian Journal reports that the President’s group has split over the coalition deal and the supporters of the President are now in a minority.

The Our Ukraine-People’s Self-defense group has 72 seats in the Rada. Apparently, 37 voted to support the coalition agreement and 35 opposed. The President opposed the deal. The leader of the group, a presidential supporter, has now stepped down claiming that he does not have the confidence of the group’s members. A press agency is reporting that President Yushchenko is talking of expelling the members of the group who voted for the coalition.

The support from (part of) the President’s group was enough to see the coalition approved, but it may not be enough for legislation to be passed. So, Ukrainian Journal speculates that Prime Minister Tymoshenko will need the support of the pro-Russian Communist party as well.

Ukraine – New (old) government

In Ukraine RTE/RFL reports Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko as saying that the government crisis is over. In contrast to previous speculation, the cabinet will reprise the Orange coalition from December 2004. Crucially, though, a new partner has also been included. Former colleague of President Viktor Yushchenko, Volodymyr Lytvyn, was elected speaker of parliament and his group, the Lytvyn People’s Bloc, which has 20 seats in parliament, has been included in the coalition. This gives the government around 248/450 seats.

Ukraine – The end of semi-presidentialism?

The extremely complicated political situation in Ukraine may claim semi-presidentialism as its victim. Ukrainian Journal reports that Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and former prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, leader of the opposition Party of the Regions, are pursuing negotiations to form a new government. Together, they would enjoy a substantial majority in the legislature.

One of the items being discussed is the idea that Tymoshenko would remain in power until 2012, while Yanukovych would be elected as president by parliament following a constitutional amendment next year. Needless to say, President Viktor Yushchenko opposes the reform, though he may be powerless to prevent it. He may still wish to dissolve parliament to try to return a legislature more favourable to him. However, he remains unpopular and there is no guarantee that fresh elections would significantly alter the parliamentary arithmetic.

Ukraine – President delays election

In October President Yushchenko dissolved parliament and called a snap election scheduled for 7 December. (See a previous post). A couple of weeks later, he announced that the election would be delayed by a week. Now, RFE/RL reports that the election has been delayed again. The election will not take place before the Orthodox Christmas on 6 January 2009. No date after that time has been set.

One reason for the delay is that Yulia Tymoshenko’s supporters opposed the election. As a result, parliament is refusing to grant funding for it.

I admit to being more than a little confused about the situation in Ukraine. My understanding was that when the government collapsed Yulia Tymoshenko would no longer be prime minister. However, this is clearly wrong. She is still in office, though also at odds, to say the least, with the president.

To further add to the complications, Ukrainian Journal reports that the opposition Regions Party, the largest group in Parliament, is flexing its muscles. With the help of some small parties plus defections from President Yushchenko’s party, they have managed to engineer the dismissal of the speaker of Parliament, who was an ally of President Yushchenko. Moreover, they are now trying to have Prime Minister Tymoshenko dismissed. As far as I can gather, they are trying to get parliament to reconvene to discuss the financial crisis. If they can do so, then they can also lodge a vote of no-confidence. If they do that, then they believe that they have the votes to dismiss Prime Minister Tymoshenko. To dismiss the speaker of parliament, they gathered 233 votes in the 450-member parliament. If they can dismiss Tymoshenko, then they will argue that they can form a new government based on that coalition, which would presumably mean that Viktor Yanukovych would once again become the prime minister. This would, also presumably, mean that an election would not take place as a viable government had been formed.

Ukraine – President calls election

The crisis in Ukraine deepens. President Yushchenko has dissolved parliament and called a snap election probably for 7 December. There is a good report by RFE/RL. There is also a slightly more detailed report in UkrainianJournal.

In one sense, this seemed like a surprising move, because recent stories had indicated that in recent days former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko had been back-pedalling somewhat and had been willing to revive the coalition with President Yushchenko’s movement. However, the president’s decision and the extremely bitter rhetoric that he used in his dissolution announcement against former prime minister Tymoshenko suggests that any post-election deal will be difficult to reach.

UkrainianJournal reports that the deal that was once proposed between the Tymoshenko block and the Party of the Regions was scuppered because the latter wanted the premiership and Tymoshenko refused to step down. Of course, the Party of the Regions may have calculated that this would happen in the hope that an election would be called and that it would benefit from the situation.

Ukraine – Government finally collapses

The phony war in Ukraine has finally come to an end as the governing coalition has been dissolved. According to the Constitution, there are now 30 days for a new government to be formed, otherwise an election can be called. The most likely coalition is between former Prime Minister Tymoshenko’s bloc and the Russia-focused Party of the Regions.

The next presidential election is due to be held in October 2009. Prime Minister Tymoshenko is likely to want to stand. Currently, President Yushchenko is extremely unpopular and his chances of being re-elected are slim. However, he is unlikely to step down. In addition, Viktor Yanukovych, the leader of the Party of the Regions, will also want to stand. The small number of coalition options and the potential for ongoing competition between the three leaders for the next year of more is likely to mean a period of instability even if parliament is dissolved.

Ukraine – government collapse

The governmental situation in Ukraine has been bad for months now, but it appears as if the coalition has finally collapsed.

In parliament, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s party allied with the opposition to pass a number of bills reducing the powers of the president. As a result, the BBC reports that all but one of 12 ministers from President Viktor Yushchenko’s party boycotted yesterday’s cabinet meeting. President Yushchenko is quoted as saying: “I will use my right to dissolve parliament and decree early elections if a new coalition is not formed within 30 days”.

Ukrainianjournal.com reports that one bill allows parliament to dismiss the foreign affairs and defense ministers, both of whom are currently nominated by the president. Apart from any other reasons, this change is particularly sensitive because President Yushchenko has been outspoken in his condemnation of Russia’s actions in Georgia and has called for Ukraine’s swift entry into NATO. However, this is opposed by the opposition Russia-focused Party of the Regions. Prime Minister Tymoshenko’s alliance with the Party of the Regions suggests that she has switched sides on this issue. Other bills take away the president’s power to nominate the head of the SBU security service and make it easier to impeach the president. President Yushchenko will probably veto all of the bills, but the alliance between Prime Minister Tymoshenko and the Party of the Regions is sufficient for presidential vetoes to be overridden.

Semi-presidentialism in the FSU – When did it begin?

The Former Soviet Union (FSU) is the home of a number of semi-presidential countries. In terms of their current constitutions, there are some unequivocal cases of semi-presidentialism: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine. Previously, Moldova was unequivocally semi-presidential too. The situation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is a little more ambiguous. In both cases, parliament ratifies the president’s decrees that appoint and dismiss the prime minister. It is debatable as to whether this is sufficient to constitute a semi-presidential constitution. The level of responsibility to parliament is low and, in any case, responsibility is only individual and not collective.

Sticking to the unequivocal cases, the question is when do we date the start of semi-presidentialism? In the case of Georgia, the answer is easy. As per a previous post, it became semi-presidential in 2004 after a constitutional amendment. For the other countries, the dates of the first independence constitutions are as follows: Armenia (1995), Azerbaijan (1995), Belarus (1994), Kazakhstan (1993), Kyrgyzstan (1993), Lithuania (1992), Moldova (1994), Russia (1993) and Ukraine (1996).

While these are the dates of the first constitutions, it is common to think of semi-presidentialism starting earlier. This is because in the period immediately following the declaration of independence, and prior to the passage of the new constitution, most of these countries grafted a directly elected president onto the existing Soviet-era constitution. So, for example, the first presidential elections under Soviet-era constitutions were held as follows: Armenia (1991), Azerbaijan (1992), Kazakhstan (1991), Kyrgyzstan (1991), Moldova (1991), Russia (1991) and Ukraine (1991). Given these constitutions were, nominally, parliamentary, this combination of a direct presidential election and a parliamentary system seems to create the conditions for semi-presidentialism. (In Belarus and Lithuania, the first direct presidential elections took place under the first independence constitution. So, there is no doubt about when they began to be semi-presidential.)

All the same, I think we have to be a little careful as to when we date the beginning of semi-presidentialism and for two reasons. Firstly, I am not sure that there are consolidated constitutional documents prior to the passage of the first constitutions. Certainly, I have been unable to find them. If they do exist, then please let me know where to get hold of them. In the absence of a consolidated document, it is to difficult to verify the start date of semi-presidentialism. Secondly, even if there were consolidated documents, would they indicate semi-presidentialism? According to the 1978 constitutions of the socialist republics of the USSR, it is certainly the case that the Council of Ministers was responsible to the parliament (Supreme Soviet) and that there was a person who occupied the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, prime ministers certainly existed in the newly independent countries from an early point: Armenia (1990), Azerbaijan (1991), Kazakhstan (1991), Kyrgyzstan (1991), Moldova (1990), Russia (1991) and Ukraine (1990). Again, though, in the absence of consolidated documents, it is difficult to verify the specific start date of semi-presidentialismism. Were there other amendments to the constitution apart from just the direct election of the president? Were there changes to the status of the prime minister and cabinet? And so on.

The precise start date of semi-presidentialism can be important because a couple of these countries experienced a brief period of democracy but then collapsed. For example, according to Freedom House Azerbaijan was a partial democracy in 1991 and 1992, but collapsed in 1993. The same is true for Kazakhstan from 1991-93 before its collapse in 1994. Studies about the positive or negative effects of semi-presidentialism on partial democracies do not have a large number of cases to go on. Therefore, the decision about whether or not to include two collapses is potentially important. If anyone has any comments, then please let me know.