Presumably one of the reasons why we study semi-presidentialism is so that we can try to learn some general rules about the ways in which particular institutions affect political life. Obviously, we do not want to make any such generalisations on the basis of evidence from one case, but it is difficult to avoid the temptation when it comes to the case of Haiti.

I reported the dismissal of Prime Minister Alexis a while ago. I also reported President Préval’s nomination of a new prime ministerial candidate, Ericq Pierre. Bearing in mind that it took nearly 18 months to appoint a prime minister from 1997-99, it is not difficult to see why this is case on the basis of M. Pierre’s current experience and some of the problems are associated with Haiti’s institutional structures.

The president’s prime ministerial nomination has to be sent to both chambers of the legislature for ratification. While there is inevitably a lot of politicking behind any such appointment in any county, Le Nouvelliste is reporting that some Senators are questioning M. Pierre’s Haitian origins, seemingly as a pretext for his rejection. It seems as if M. Pierre has not furnished the birth certificates of his grandparents as part as part of the nomination dossier that the Senate is currently discussing. Yet the Haitian constitution requires a prime ministerial candidate to be of Haitian and for his parents and grandparents to be Haitian too. So, M. Pierre’s ratification may be denied on these constitutional grounds.

Let us just assume this is a delaying tactic, perhaps because the mandate of a number of Senators is due to end in a couple of days. When it does, there will have to be new elections and it is not clear to me whether the remaining senators can make a decision about M. Pierre’s appointment prior to the convening of the new Senate. So, the delay may be quite considerable. Anyway, even if the Senate ratifies M. Pierre in the next couple of days, the same process has to be completed by the National Assembly. Again, the prime minister’s dossier, with details of his nationality, his financial propriety and so forth, will be the subject of intense scrutiny. Finally, even if (when?) M. Pierre’s appointment has been ratified by both houses, then he has to submit a declaration of general policy to both houses as well. In order for him to remain in office, this will have to be approved by both chambers, which will be no mean feat.

The bottom line is that the constitution of Haiti provides a large number of veto points when it comes to appointing a new prime minister. Given the party system is fractionalised and individual parties are factionalised, this makes it very difficult to make an appointment. Also, presumably, the appointee will only be approved if s/he has made promises to a number of groups. Some of these promises may be contradictory. They are all also likely to involve the distribution of resources that the Haitian government does not have in abundance. So, not only is appointment difficult, but subsequently the appointee is likely to be a hostage to parliamentary fortune because of the nature of the appointment process.

At the risk of generalising from one case, this does not seem to me to be the best type of institutional design for a new democracy. While the presence of many veto points is almost certainly motivated by a desire to prevent autocracy, there is the potential for the stalemate and/or crisis caused by the veto points to lead to the very thing that it is trying to prevent, namely the autocratic seizure of power as a way of reasserting political authority.