Just before I started this blog, Kyrgyzstan adopted a revised constitution in a referendum held on 21 October 2007. The text of the Constitution can be found on the site of the Venice Commission.

The constitution was a result of the so-called Tulip Revolution that followed the disputed result of the parliamentary elections in February/March 2005 and that led to the resignation of President Akayev. In July 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected president and a process of constitutional revision began. However, President Bakiyev’s document was struck down by the Constitutional Court in September 2007. The October 2007 referendum was held to overturn the Court’s ruling. There is an article on the Court’s decision at RFE/RL. At the referendum, there was a large majority in favour of the new constitution.

Kyrgyzstan has a fairly complicated constitutional history. As far as I have unravelled the semi-presidential aspects of it, then this is how the story goes.

The first constitution dates back to May 1993. The president was directly elected and there was a prime minister. However, the mechanisms for parliament being able to hold the government accountable were very weak. There was no provision for parliament to censure the government of its own volition. Instead, the president’s nominee for PM required parliament’s consent (Art. 46 (2)), while the president could only dismiss the PM with the parliament’s consent (Art. 46 (5)). Therefore, it is arguable whether Kyrgyzstan was semi-presidential at this time, though it clearly had some key semi-presidential attributes.

The constitution was amended by a referendum in February 1996. This time Article 71 (5) clearly stated that parliament could pass a vote of no-confidence, though a two-thirds majority was required. However, the president could decide to reject the censure. If it was voted again within three months, then president could again decide to reject it or dissolve parliament. Also, Article 71 (3) stated that if the president’s nominee for PM was voted down by parliament three times, the the president could appoint a PM and dissolve parliament. Again, therefore, Kyrgyzstan was on the very cusp of semi-presidentialism.

Further amendments were passed in 1998, but did not affect Article 71. I do not have the amendments passed in 2001, but my understanding is that they did not affect the (dubious) semi-presidential nature of the constitution. In February 2003 further amendments were approved by referendum, but, to all intents and purposes, the situation was the same.

The Tulip Revolution resulted in another round of constitutional revision. The RFE/RL report paints a picture of a fairly confused and very disputed constitutional situation during the period 2005-2007. The result, eventually, was the Constitution that is now in place.

Article 69 now reduces the president’s discretion over the appointment of the PM. Article 71 also only requires a majority of votes for a censure motion against the government to be passed. However, the president may still decide to ignore the censure vote and, if another is passed within three months, the president has to dismiss the PM or dissolve the parliament.

In some senses, the 2007 constitution is the most semi-presidential since 1993. However, the restrictions on parliamentary censure raise issues as to whether the PM and government can be considered to be responsible to the legislature

All told, Kyrgyzstan is still on the cusp of semi-presidentialism, but probably just about merits being included in the list of countries with semi-presidential constitutions.